Abstract. In this paper we address two important topics in hyperelliptic cryptography. The rst is how to construct in a veri ably random manner hyperelliptic curves for use in cryptography in generas two and three. The second topic is how to perform divisor compression in the hyperelliptic case. Hence in both cases we generalize concepts used in the more familiar elliptic curve case to the hyperelliptic context.
Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography was co-invented in 1985 by V. Miller 9 and N. Koblitz 7 . Cryptography based on elliptic curves is especially attractive due to the supposed di culty of the discrete logarithm problem in the group of rational points on an elliptic curve. In 1989 Koblitz generalized this concept to hyperelliptic curves 8 . In hyperelliptic cryptography the hard problem on which the security i s based is the discrete logarithm problem in the divisor class group of the curve.
Whilst elliptic curve cryptography is starting to become commercially deployed, hyperelliptic cryptography is still at the stage of academic interest. This is mainly due to the greater complexity o f the underlying arithmetic and the fact that the protocols have been less standardized. One main problem in the hyperelliptic case, as argued in 10 , is that it is currently very hard to generate hyperelliptic curves for use in cryptography which do not have any added extra structure. Another problem is that the supporting algorithms which exist in the elliptic curve case have not been fully developed in the hyperelliptic case. In this paper we generalize two such techniques from the setting of elliptic curve cryptography to the setting of hyperelliptic curves.
In the rst we give a method to produce hyperelliptic curves in genus two and three which are generated in a veri ably random manner. In the second we give a method to perform divisor compression.
The rst contribution is needed to produce suitable curves in a trusted manner. In elliptic curve cryptography, one way t o c hoose a curve is to generate curves at random until one satis es the correct security requirements. However, someone else then using the system needs to trust that you did not construct a special curve which has some weakness that only you know about. To overcome this problem various standards bodies, e.g. 1 , have proposed that the curve is generated in the following manner:
3. Compute the group order, N, using the Schoof-Atkin-Elkies algorithm. 4 . If the curve passes the known security c hecks then publish the triple S; E; N, otherwise return to the rst step. Under the assumption that SHA-1 is a one-way function the above method of curve generation prevents the choice of special elliptic curves with secret weaknesses. An elliptic curve chosen in the above way is said to have been chosen veri ably at random" since any third party given the triple S; E; N can check very quickly that not only is the group order n correct but that the curve could not have been created with a known weakness since it would have been computationally impossible to reverse engineer the value of S which g a ve E using the above algorithm.
We show how the above algorithm can be used to generate veri ably random hyperelliptic curves in characteristic two for use in cryptography. Our method does not produce random hyperelliptic curves taken from the totality of all hyperelliptic curves but produces hyperelliptic curves which h a ve v eri ably been constructed in a random manner from a certain subset. In other words it is computationally infeasible for us to have created a special curve with some hidden weakness. However, we stress that since our method produces random hyperelliptic curves from a special family it is possible that the curves constructed by our method have a weakness which w e are not aware of.
Our second contribution is to give a method in all characteristics to perform divisor compression. In the elliptic curve case it is common practice to use a technique called point compression to reduce the sizes of the public keys being transported by fty percent. This is particularly important when deploying ECC in an environment where bandwidth is constrained. We will show that the elliptic curve point compression techniques can be naturally generalized to the hyperelliptic setting.
Producing Hyperelliptic Curves
Our technique of producing hyperelliptic curves veri ably at random is based on the method of Weil restriction of scalars as outlined in 6 . In this technique one takes an elliptic curve, E, o ver the eld K = F q n , where q i s a p o wer of two and then one constructs a hyperelliptic curve, H, o ver the sub eld k = F q . Since the groups EK and J a c k H are related by a group homomorphism one can easily compute, in certain cases, the group order of J a c k H, thus overcoming a major obstacle to the adoption of cryptographic systems based on hyperelliptic curves.
To x notation we are trying to generate a hyperelliptic curve H over the eld F q , o f g e n us g and of group order N = 2 l p, where p is a prime. Before giving our technique for the generation of hyperelliptic curves we need to summarize the main security requirements for our curve. p 2 160 . This is to protect against Pollard-rho and Baby-Step Giant-Step attacks. g 4. This is to protect against the method of Gaudry 4 . q = 2 r , where r is prime. This is to protect against using Weil descent on J a c Fq H.
The smallest s 1 such that q s 1 mod p should be greater than twenty. This is to protect against the Tate-pairing attack 3 . In 6 a method is given for nding a group homomorphism from an elliptic curve de ned over F q n to a hyperelliptic curve, H, de ned over F q . The technique given is completely deterministic, although the resulting model for H is slightly complicated, an issue which w e shall return to below. The method of 6 uses a set of Artin-Schreier extensions, the number of distinct extensions being given by a n integer m, which satis es 1 m n. For the exact de nition of m see 6 , all that we shall require is that m is almost always of the order of n and that the genus of the resulting hyperelliptic curve is either 2 m,1 or 2 m,1 , 1. In our applications we are able to control precisely when we obtain genus 2 m,1 or genus 2 m,1 , 1.
Since we wish to produce hyperelliptic curves with Jacobians of the same group order as EK w e need to choose elliptic curves so that the values of n and m are related by q n = q g . In other words we require n = 2 m,1 or n = 2 m,1 , 1:
Since one of our security requirements on g is that it should be less than four, these later conditions are easy to satisfy.
For cryptographic purposes it is advantageous to produce a model for the hyperelliptic curve of the form H : Y 2 + HXY = FX where deg HX g and deg FX = 2 g+ 1 .Such a model will be called reduced" and we shall now explain a deterministic method to turn the hyperelliptic model, produced by the method of 6 , into a reduced model.
Assume that a xed representation has been chosen for the nite elds of size q n and q. Using this xed representations we can de ne lexicographical orders in the nite elds, hence orders on polynomials, matrices etc. Utilizing normalization of polynomials, polynomial division, Hermite normal forms and other such reduction techniques we are then able to always consider the smallest or the same object having a desired property.
Taking the model for H produced by the method in 6 we then move a well de ned desingularized, over P 1 , rami ed point to in nity. A reduced hyperelliptic equation is then obtained by computing the minimal polynomial over the rational sub eld of a function of smallest odd pole order at in nity and with no other poles.
Since the algorithm, outlined above, to proceed from an elliptic curve to a reduced model for a hyperelliptic curve is completely deterministic, all we need do to produce a veri ably random" hyperelliptic curve is to nd an elliptic curve veri ably at random" with the required properties.
2.1. Genus Two. Take a nite eld of the form K = F q 2 where q is 2 raised to a prime exponent. We construct, using the technique from 1 a v eri ably random elliptic curve of the form Y 2 + X Y= X 3 + aX 2 + b where a; b 2 K, with group order equal to 2p where p is a prime number. Note that since p is a prime number and q is`large', in the Weil descent we almost always obtain m = 2 and so the resulting hyperelliptic curve will have genus two. Then using the technique of Weil descent w e can construct a hyperelliptic curve o ver the eld k = F q which, with overwhelming probability, has group order divisible by p. Indeed we w ould be extremely surprised if the group order was not divisible by p, since then the map : EK ! J a c k H constructed in 6 w ould have k ernel divisible by p, which is highly unlikely. Lemma 1. If q 2 5 and p divides the order of J a c k H then the Jacobian of the hyperelliptic curve of genus two constructed a b ove has group order exactly 2p. Proof. The Hasse-Weil Theorem tells us that the group order of a Jacobian of a curve, C, o f g e n us g over a eld of q elements satis es p q , 1 2g J a c k C p q + 1 2g :
We apply this to the elliptic curve and the hyperelliptic curve under consideration to obtain p q , 1 4 But this implies that the cofactor must be equal to two i f q 2 5 . 2.2. Genus Three. For genus three we need to proceed in a slightly di erent w ay.
First we choose a nite eld of the form K = F q 3 where again q is 2 raised to a prime exponent. Then we take an random 160-bit string and pass it through SHA-1 to obtain a eld element, v 2 F q 3 , using the methods of 1 . Setting b = v + v q we see that
We then compute the elliptic curve Y 2 + X Y= X 3 + X 2 + b and its group order. This is repeated until we nd a group order equal to 2p where p is a prime. Then using the arguments of 6 we will obtain a hyperelliptic curve o f genus three. With high probability the group order will be divisible by p. Although we are not choosing elliptic curves completely at random from all elliptic curves de ned over K, w e are choosing them uniformly at random from a subset of size q 2 . Which implies that the cofactor is equal to two, as long as q 2 8 .
Our technique for constructing hyperelliptic curves for use in cryptography is dominated by the time needed to apply the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin SEA algorithm to a set of elliptic curves, until one with the correct cryptographic properties is determined. The step of transforming the elliptic curve i n to a hyperelliptic curve only takes a few minutes. Hence to compute a single hyperelliptic curve of genus two with the correct cryptographic properties takes, for a Jacobian of size roughly 2 190 , on the order of a few tens of minutes. The main computational task is to repeatedly apply the SEA algorithm until a suitable elliptic curve is found. Of course, exact times depend strongly on the details of the SEA implementation
In 5 a rst attempt at an analogue of the SEA algorithm for hyperelliptic curves of genus two is reported on. The authors manage to compute the order of a random hyperelliptic curve of genus two of group order roughly 2 126 . However, this takes them many days of computing time. In practice one would need to repeat their method a large number of times before a suitable curve for use in cryptography was determined. Whilst the method in 5 is to be preferred over ours, it can only be used when and if the algorithms become su ciently fast. Our method on the other hand, as we have already stated, is practical using today's knowledge and technology.
At the end of the paper we will give some example hyperelliptic curves constructed with our method at various security levels.
Divisor Compression
As noted previously point compression in the elliptic curve case is an important tool used to save around fty percent of the bandwidth in transferring storing public keys and in Di e-Hellman key exchange. Before describing our analogous method in the hyperelliptic setting we shall explain the exact data format normally used for divisors on hyperelliptic curves. The zero in the group is represented by the pair 1; 0. That the divisor is reduced means that no rami ed place occurs in the support of D with multiplicity greater than one, and that if a place, p, occurs in the support of D then the image of p under the hyperelliptic involution does not. In many protocols one needs to transmit divisors, naively this requires at most g elements of k to represent aX and at most g elements of k to represent bX.
However, given aX there are only a small number of possible values for bX which could correspond to aX. We shall show h o w one can recover the correct bX from only aX, and at most an additional g bits of information.
Our rst task is to decide a canonical order on the irreducible polynomials of degree less than or equal to g, which are de ned over k. This is done by xing a eld representation and using the lexicographic order used for a similar purpose in Section 2.
When we are either compressing or decompressing we rst factorize aX i n to its irreducible factors and order them. Since factorization of polynomials can be performed in random polynomial time, and in applications the degree of aX will be quite small usually less than four this factorization stage is no barrier to our method.
For example when g = 2 w e need to factorize a degree two polynomial. This factors either when a certain trace is zero, for the even characteristic case, or when the discriminant is a square, for the odd characteristic case. In either characteristic we can easily deduce the factorization when the polynomial is reducible using standard techniques for solving quadratic equations over nite elds. Similar considerations apply when g = 3 .
Each irreducible factor, pX, of aX will correspond to at most two prime divisors on H: D p = pX; q X and D 0 p = pX; ,qX , HX:
Since the divisor we are compressing or decompressing is reduced we know that only one of these two possibilities is in the support of D. Hence for each prime divisor of aX w e need only specify one bit of information to determine whether D p or D 0 p is in the support of D. The only questions remains as to how to produce this bit and how to recover the correct value of bX, given aX and the resulting bits.
3.1. Compression. The basic idea is to execute the following steps for every distinct irreducible factor pX o f aX, this gives the bits p .
1. If pX is rami ed in kH set p = 0 . 2. If the characteristic of k is odd then let p denote the parity of the smallest non-zero coe cient o f bX mod pX. 3 . If the characteristic of k is even then we set tX = bX=HX mod pX; notice that the inversion of HX modulo pX can be accomplished since pX is unrami ed and so gcdpX; H X = 1 , W e then let p denote the least signi cant bit of the constant term of tX.
Hence the compressed form of the divisor D is faX; s g where s is the bit string containing the p for each irreducible factor of aX. The bit string is ordered with respect to the ordering on the distinct irreducible factors of aX.
3.2. Decompression. Suppose pX k exactly divides aX, then if we can recover bX modulo pX k for all irreducible factors pX of aX we can then recover bX either via the Chinese Remainder Theorem or by adding together the local components for each prime pX.
Since aX; b X is a reduced divisor, we know that if pX is rami ed then the value of k above is one, and recovering bX is trivial.
We n o w turn to the case where pX is not rami ed. Then recover bX modulo pX k , is trivially done once we know bX mod pX. This recovery of bX modulo pX k from bX mod pX can be accomplished in one of two w ays:
1. Using Hensel's Lemma.
2. By multiplying the divisor pX; b X mod pX by k.
So we h a ve reduced the decompression problem to determining the value of bX mod pX given pX and the bit p .
Since pX is irreducible, the algebra k X =pX is a eld and we can apply well known techniques to solve quadratic equations in a eld to determine a candidate value bX for bX mod pX. To check whether bX is the correct value we compute the value of the bit p assuming that bX is correct. If this value agrees with the supplied value then we know that bX = bX mod pX, otherwise we set bX = ,bX , HX mod aX. 4 . Example Curves In this section we detail some sample hyperelliptic curves at the more common security levels used in elliptic curve cryptography. These curves have been generated veri ably at random using the methods described above from the given seed. All numbers are in hexadecimal and the eld elements are also presented in hexadecimal via a polynomial basis. So for example the hexadecimal numberC1 corresponds to the polynomial w 7 + w 6 + 1 .
In each example we state the seed, S, used as input to SHA-1 to generate the original elliptic curve, we give the coe cients a and b of the elliptic curve 
